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A B S T R A C T
The distinctive experience of pain, beyond mere processing of nociceptive inputs, is much debated in psychology
and neuroscience. One aspect of perceptual experience is captured by metacognition—the ability to monitor and
evaluate one’s own mental processes. We investigated conﬁdence in judgements about nociceptive pain (i.e. pain
that arises from the activation of nociceptors by a noxious stimulus) to determine whether metacognitive pro-
cesses contribute to the distinctiveness of the pain experience. Our participants made intensity judgements about
noxious heat, innocuous warmth, and visual contrast (ﬁrst-order, perceptual decisions) and rated their con-
ﬁdence in those judgements (second-order, metacognitive decisions). First-order task performance between
modalities was balanced using adaptive staircase procedures. For each modality, we quantiﬁed metacognitive
eﬃciency (meta-d’/d’)—the degree to which participants’ conﬁdence reports were informed by the same evi-
dence that contributed to their perceptual judgements—and metacognitive bias (mean conﬁdence)—the parti-
cipant’s tendency to report higher or lower conﬁdence overall. We found no overall diﬀerences in metacognitive
eﬃciency or mean conﬁdence between modalities. Mean conﬁdence ratings were highly correlated between all
three tasks, reﬂecting stable inter-individual variability in metacognitive bias. However, metacognitive eﬃ-
ciency for pain varied independently of metacognitive eﬃciency for warmth and visual perception. That is, those
participants who had higher metacognitive eﬃciency in the visual task also tended to have higher metacognitive
eﬃciency in the warmth task, but not necessarily in the pain task. We thus suggest that some distinctive and
idiosyncratic aspects of the pain experience may stem from additional variability at a metacognitive level. We
further speculate that this additional variability may arise from the aﬀective or arousal aspects of pain.
1. Introduction
Subjectivity is considered a fundamental aspect of the pain experi-
ence (e.g. Beecher, 1957, 1965; Coghill, McHaﬃe, & Yen, 2003; Guerit,
2012; Hyyppä, 1987; Koyama, McHaﬃe, Laurienti, & Coghill, 2005;
Raij, Numminen, Narvanen, Hiltunen, & Hari, 2005). One facet of
subjective experience is metacognition—the ability to monitor and
evaluate one’s own mental processes (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994).
Metacognition can be measured by how closely conﬁdence reports track
the ﬁdelity of the mental process in question. In perceptual decision-
making tasks, people with high metacognitive sensitivity are more con-
ﬁdent when they have made a correct judgement (i.e. when their per-
ceptual decision accurately reﬂects the physical properties of a sensory
stimulus) than when they have made an incorrect judgement. In-
dependently of metacognitive sensitivity, a person might show a
metacognitive bias, that is, a tendency to be over- or under-conﬁdent
regardless of whether the judgement was correct. These measures
jointly characterise how people evaluate their perceptual decisions.
Applied to judgements about nociceptive pain—i.e. pain that arises
from the activation of nociceptors by a noxious stimulus (IASP Task
Force on Taxonomy, 2011)—metacognitive measures may shed light on
some distinctive features of pain perception, such as its vividness and its
variability, even when the physical properties of the evoking stimulus
are held constant (Coghill et al., 2003; Nickel et al., 2017; Schulz et al.,
2015; Woo et al., 2017).
There are several reasons to suspect that metacognition for noci-
ceptive pain may diﬀer from metacognition for other sensory mod-
alities. First, nociception, like interoceptive senses, serves a primary
role in body regulation and defence (Craig, 2002, 2003), rather than
ﬁne discrimination of stimulus attributes. Indeed, the ﬁrst response to
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nociceptor activation is usually a reﬂexive defensive reaction (Ellrich,
Bromm, & Hopf, 1997; Skljarevski & Ramadan, 2002; Willer, 1977).
Metacognitive oversight would beneﬁt a sensory system tuned for dis-
criminative precision because it allows for error correction and strategic
behavioural adjustments in response to uncertainty (Redford, 2010;
Yeung & Summerﬁeld, 2012). In contrast, sensory systems that main-
tain homeostasis and facilitate quick defensive reactions must be able to
function eﬀectively without conscious cognitive control. Thus, meta-
cognition may have less access to pain and to interoceptive senses than
to sensory systems with ﬁne discriminative capacities such as vision.
Indeed, studies of interoceptive heartbeat perception have generally
found poor metacognitive sensitivity to such signals (Azevedo, Aglioti,
& Lenggenhager, 2016; Garﬁnkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley,
2015; Khalsa et al., 2008) and dissociations in metacognitive sensitivity
between interoceptive and exteroceptive sensory modalities (Garﬁnkel
et al., 2016).2 Nociceptive metacognition might be similarly dissociated
from exteroceptive metacognition because a basic function of noci-
ception is to defend the integrity of the body by allowing quick motor
reactions.
Second, nociceptive pain elicits physiological arousal and aﬀective
responses in addition to sensory processes (Hilgard & Morgan, 1975;
Lenox, 1970; Melzack & Casey, 1968; Rainville, Carrier, Hofbauer,
Bushnell, & Duncan, 1999; Storm, 2008). Studies that induced changes
in arousal through subliminal aﬀective priming (Allen et al., 2016) and
pharmacological manipulation (Hauser et al., 2017) suggested that
arousal responses may reduce the tendency to adjust metacognitive
judgements according to internal or external noise, although they dis-
agreed on which aspect of metacognition (sensitivity or bias) was most
aﬀected. Additionally, some studies have reported that negatively-va-
lenced material increased measures of conﬁdence in perception
(Koizumi, Mobbs, & Lau, 2016) and in subsequent recall (Schwartz,
2010; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010), while others found no eﬀect of
negative valence on metacognition (D'Angelo & Humphreys, 2012;
Jersakova, Souchay, & Allen, 2015). Though these studies oﬀer mixed
evidence on the relations between arousal, aﬀect, and metacognition,
they suggest that the negatively valenced and arousing qualities of
nociceptive pain could alter the calibration of metacognitive judge-
ments, perhaps yielding over-conﬁdence in perceptual decisions.
We investigated how metacognitive access to nociception compares
to thermoception, a sensory modality that also serves a regulatory role
for the body, and to vision, a sensory modality with ﬁne discriminative
capacities that is widely studied in metacognition research. Participants
made intensity discrimination judgements about three diﬀerent kinds of
stimuli: noxious heat (pain), innocuous warmth, and visual gratings
(contrast). They also rated their conﬁdence in those judgements. We
quantiﬁed metacognitive access using the ratio meta-d’/d’. This re-
presents the eﬃciency with which conﬁdence ratings discriminate be-
tween ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ trials, while controlling for diﬀerences in
perceptual sensitivity (Fleming, 2017; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). To
examine metacognitive bias, we also compared mean conﬁdence rat-
ings across these three modalities. We controlled task diﬃculty across
participants and sensory modalities using an adaptive staircase proce-
dure. Because both nociception and thermoception serve chieﬂy de-
fensive and regulatory functions (Craig, 2002, 2003), we expected to
ﬁnd lower metacognitive eﬃciency scores for nociceptive pain and
innocuous warmth discrimination tasks than for a visual contrast dis-
crimination task. Further, we expected that individual diﬀerences in
metacognitive eﬃciency would correlate across pain and warmth dis-
crimination tasks, but that neither would correlate with metacognitive
eﬃciency for visual contrast discrimination. Finally, we predicted
higher conﬁdence in judgements about pain, relative to judgements
about warmth and visual contrast, because of the characteristic vivid-
ness and aversiveness of pain experiences.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
To determine sample size, we used sequential hypothesis testing
with Bayes factors (Schönbrodt, Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, &
Perugini, 2017). We selected a minimum sample size of 24, and deﬁned
our stopping rule as the point at which the Bayes factors (BF10) for
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) across our three conditions were higher
than 3.00 (implying moderate support for the alternative hypothesis) or
lower than 0.33 (implying moderate support for the null hypothesis;
Jeﬀreys, 1961; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013). We calculated Bayes factors
after running 24 participants, and again after each additional 4 parti-
cipants. Our stopping rule was reached at 36 participants (18 female,
mean age=24.50, range=19–38). Sequential hypothesis testing with
Bayes factors does not require corrections for multiple tests because the
critical inference is based not on the probability of making a Type I
error, but on a ratio (BF10) indicating how much more (or less) likely
the data would be under the alternative hypothesis compared to the
null hypothesis (Schönbrodt et al., 2017).
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, normal
cutaneous sensation, and no history of neurological or psychiatric dis-
orders by self-report. They gave written informed consent prior to the
experiment, and were compensated for their time with a per-hour
payment of £7.50 or 1 course credit. One participant chose not to
complete the experiment, and another participant’s data were lost due
to equipment failure. These incomplete datasets were not analysed. A
third participant ﬁnished the experiment but performed at chance level
on the innocuous warmth discrimination task, so that participant’s
entire dataset was also excluded from all analyses. These participants
were replaced with others in the ﬁnal sample. The study was approved
by the University College London Research Ethics Committee, and
carried out in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical
Association Declaration of Helsinki.
2.2. Materials
Visual stimuli and response prompts were generated in the Cogent
2000 toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php) for MATLAB
8.5.0 (Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA, USA). The visual stimuli consisted
of a central white ﬁxation cross 2° across (luminance: 13.64 cd/m2) and
Gabor gratings at 3° of visual angle (2.2 cycles per degree, 0.2° Gaussian
envelope), presented at± 7.5° eccentricity from the ﬁxation cross. The
background was a uniform grey screen (luminance: 3.66 cd/m2). The
stimuli were displayed on a 17″ LCD monitor (Dell E173FPb, Round
Rock, TX, USA; 1280×1024 screen resolution, 75-Hz refresh rate). The
display was gamma-calibrated using a CS-100A photometer (Konica
Minolta, Tokyo, Japan).
Noxious and innocuous thermal stimuli were delivered using a
computer-controlled Peltier thermode with a 13-mm diameter pen-
shaped probe (Physitemp NTE-2A, Clifton, NJ, USA). The probe was
aﬃxed to a computer-controlled haptic device (PHANToM Premium
1.5, Geomagic, Morrisville, NC, USA) that was used to jitter stimulus
position and to bring the probe into contact with the hand dorsum with
a light force of 0.2 N. Skin temperature on the hand dorsum was
monitored with a spot infrared thermometer (Precision Gold N85FR;
Maplin Electronics, Rotherham, UK).
2.3. Procedure
All participants completed a perceptual intensity discrimination
task in three diﬀerent modalities: visual contrast, innocuous warmth,
and nociceptive pain. Participants also completed a manipulation check
2 Note that none of those ﬁndings were based exclusively on the heartbeat
counting task, which was shown to be a ﬂawed measure of interoceptive ac-
curacy (Zamariola, Maurage, Luminet, & Corneille, 2018).
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in which they rated the painfulness of stimuli used in the nociceptive
pain and innocuous warmth tasks, to conﬁrm that the temperature
ranges were perceived diﬀerently. These four tasks were completed in
two experimental sessions on separate days. The second session was
done within three days of the ﬁrst session, and at the same time of day.
Each session lasted about 1.5 h. The nociceptive pain and innocuous
warmth discrimination tasks were always done in diﬀerent sessions to
minimise eﬀects of habituation, sensitisation, or receptor fatigue from
repeated thermal stimulation. The order of these tasks was counter-
balanced across participants. The manipulation check was always done
in the second session, after both the nociceptive pain and innocuous
warmth discrimination tasks had been completed. The visual contrast
discrimination task was done in the ﬁrst session with either the noci-
ceptive pain or the innocuous warmth discrimination task. Task order
in the ﬁrst session was counterbalanced across participants.
Each task consisted of 180 trials of a two-interval alternative forced
choice (2IFC) judgement. Participants were given a short break after
every 20 trials. The ﬁrst 20 trials were considered a practice block, and
were not included in any statistical analyses. Each trial consisted of a
reference stimulus, which was presented at the same stimulus intensity
(i.e. the same contrast or temperature) on every trial, and a test stimulus,
whose intensity was adapted throughout the task using a continuous 2-
down/1-up staircase procedure, in order to keep discrimination accu-
racy at approximately 70.7% (Levitt, 1971). The order and locations of
the reference and target stimuli were counterbalanced across trials.
2.3.1. Visual contrast discrimination
Participants sat with their head in a chin rest approximately 57 cm
from the screen. Each trial began with a central ﬁxation cross
(1000ms), followed by two Gabor patches presented sequentially
(200ms each) with a 300-ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI). The ﬁrst
Gabor patch was presented either 7.5° to the left or 7.5° to the right of
the ﬁxation cross (pseudorandomly with equal probability across
trials), and the second Gabor patch was presented in the other location,
in order to mirror the spatial jittering procedure used for the innocuous
warmth and noxious heat tasks (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). After the
oﬀset of the second stimulus, a prompt appeared on the screen asking
participants to report which stimulus was higher in contrast. Following
their response, another prompt appeared asking them to report how
conﬁdent they were in their response on a scale of 1 (not conﬁdent) to 4
(conﬁdent). Participants were encouraged to use the entire conﬁdence
scale over the course of the task. They used a numerical keypad to re-
spond to both prompts (Fig. 1a).
The reference stimulus was always presented with 50% contrast.
The test stimulus started at 70% and was adapted throughout the task
based on performance. It was increased by 3% following an incorrect
response and decreased by 3% following two consecutive correct re-
sponses.
2.3.2. Innocuous warmth discrimination
Participants sat with their left hand placed palm down on the table
in front of them. Prior to the task, the baseline skin temperature on their
left hand dorsum was recorded (M=31.04 °C, SD=2.19 °C). Each trial
began with a central ﬁxation cross which remained on the screen until
response prompts were displayed. The haptic device sequentially de-
livered two contact thermal stimuli (2000ms each) to distinct locations
on the left hand dorsum with a 3000-ms ISI. Stimulus location was
jittered between four diﬀerent locations on the hand dorsum to avoid
peripheral eﬀects such as receptor fatigue or persistent changes in skin
temperature. The distance between these locations was adjusted for
each participant based on hand size and shape, but was always at least
15 mm. After the oﬀset of the second stimulus, a prompt appeared on
the screen asking participants to report which stimulus was warmer.
Then participants rated their conﬁdence in their perceptual decision, as
described in Section 2.3.1 above. Skin temperature on the left hand
dorsum was monitored between blocks to ensure it had returned to the
baseline skin temperature before starting the next block (mean
change=0.10 °C, SD=0.27 °C).
The reference stimulus was always 38.0 °C. The target stimulus
started at 40.0 °C and was adapted throughout the task based on per-
formance. It was increased by 0.5 °C following an incorrect response
and decreased by 0.5 °C following two consecutive correct responses.
The test stimulus was never increased higher than 43.0 °C—even if a
participant made an incorrect response when comparing a 43.0 °C test
stimulus with the 38.0 °C reference stimulus—to avoid delivering sti-
muli in the noxious heat range.
2.3.3. Nociceptive pain discrimination
The procedure of the nociceptive pain discrimination task was the
same as the procedure for innocuous warmth discrimination (see
Section 2.3.2), except that we used a higher temperature range of
noxious heat for thermal stimulation, and participants reported which
stimulus was more painful. The reference stimulus was always 45.0 °C
(i.e. the normative heat pain threshold; Dyck et al., 1993; Yarnitsky,
Sprecher, Zaslansky, & Hemli, 1995). The target stimulus started at
47.0 °C and was adapted throughout the task based on performance. It
was increased by 0.5 °C following an ‘incorrect’ response (i.e. an un-
expected response based on noxious stimulus intensity) and decreased
by 0.5 °C following two consecutive ‘correct’ responses (i.e. the ex-
pected response based on noxious stimulus intensity). The test stimulus
was never increased higher than 50.0 °C as a precaution against skin
damage. The baseline skin temperature on the left hand dorsum was
recorded prior to the task (M=31.24 °C, SD=2.83 °C), and monitored
between blocks to ensure it had returned to baseline before starting the
next block (mean change=0.17 °C, SD=0.37 °C).
2.3.4. Manipulation check for thermal stimuli
In each trial, a single thermal stimulus (2000ms) was delivered to
the left hand dorsum. The temperature of the stimulus was set to either
the lowest temperature delivered in the nociceptive pain discrimination
task (i.e. 45.0 °C) or the highest temperature delivered on any trial to
each individual participant in the innocuous warmth discrimination
task (M=42.68 °C, SD=0.54 °C). These temperatures were chosen to
ensure that even the most similar stimuli delivered in the nociceptive
pain and innocuous warmth discrimination tasks were perceived dif-
ferently. After stimulus oﬀset, a prompt appeared on the screen asking
participants to report how painful the stimulus was on a scale of 1 (not
painful) to 4 (painful). The brief task consisted of 20 trials—10 of each
stimulus temperature—in a randomised order.
2.3.5. Statistical analysis
First, we compared the percentage of correct responses between
tasks using a Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA and Bayesian paired
samples t-tests with default Cauchy priors (t-tests: r=0.707; ANOVA:
rﬁxed= 1, rrandom= 0.5) to check whether our staircase procedures
were successful. Then we used participants’ 2IFC intensity judgements
and conﬁdence ratings to calculate signal detection theoretic measures
of ﬁrst-order perceptual sensitivity (d’), second-order metacognitive
sensitivity (meta-d’), and metacognitive eﬃciency (meta-d’/d’) for each
participant in each sensory modality. To do this, we used a single-
subject Bayesian estimation approach, which tends to perform better
than the maximum likelihood estimation and sum-of-squared error
approaches when there are relatively few trials per subject and condi-
tion (Fleming, 2017). We calculated metacognitive bias as the partici-
pant’s mean conﬁdence rating in each task, irrespective of accuracy.
Then we used Bayesian repeated measures ANOVAs and Bayesian
paired samples t-tests to look for diﬀerences in perceptual sensitivity,
metacognitive sensitivity, metacognitive eﬃciency, and mean con-
ﬁdence between sensory modalities.
We used Bayesian Pearson correlations with a default stretched beta
prior over positive coeﬃcient values (width=1) to investigate whether
individual diﬀerences in these four dependent variables were positively
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correlated across all possible pairs of sensory modalities in our design.
For each condition and dependent measure, we report the mean and the
95% credible interval (CI). We used frequentist Steiger’s Z tests im-
plemented by the R package cocor (Diedenhofen & Musch, 2015) to
compare correlation coeﬃcients for overlapping pairs of dependent
measures. Additionally, we used a hierarchical Bayesian model to es-
timate group-level correlation coeﬃcients for individual diﬀerences in
metacognitive eﬃciency (Fleming, 2017).
All Bayesian hypothesis tests were performed in JASP (version
0.8.1.1; http://www.jasp-stats.org). BF10 values indicate how much
more likely the alternative hypothesis is than the null hypothesis, given
the prior and the evidence (Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, &
Grasman, 2010). A BF10 greater than 3.00 or less than 0.33 is con-
sidered to show moderate support for the alternative or the null hy-
pothesis, respectively. Similarly, a BF10 greater than 10.00 (or less than
0.10) is considered to show strong support for the alternative (or the
null) hypothesis (Jeﬀreys, 1961; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013). One of the
main advantages of Bayesian hypothesis testing is that, unlike the p-
value in standard frequentist hypothesis testing, the Bayes factor dis-
tinguishes between results that support the null hypothesis
(BF10 < 0.33) and tests that lack the statistical power to infer support
for either the alternative or the null hypothesis (0.33 < BF10 < 3.00).
Thus, when reporting the results of these tests below, we distinguish
between tests showing evidence for a diﬀerence (or correlation) be-
tween conditions (BF10 > 3.00), tests showing evidence for no diﬀer-
ence (or correlation) between conditions (BF10 < 0.33), and tests that
were inconclusive (0.33 < BF10 < 3.00).
3. Results
3.1. First-order performance
3.1.1. Percentage of correct responses
A Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA showed strong evidence for
diﬀerences in the percentage of correct responses between sensory
modalities, BF10= 1.04×107. Follow-up Bayesian paired samples t-
tests showed that participants made fewer correct responses in the
innocuous warmth discrimination task (M=68.9%, 95% CI= [67.6%,
70.1%]) than in the visual contrast discrimination task (M=71.7%,
95% CI= [71.3%, 72.2%]), BF10= 328, and the nociceptive pain dis-
crimination task (M=72.2%, 95% CI= [71.7%, 72.7%]),
BF10= 5.09×104. The comparison between percentages of correct
responses in the visual contrast discrimination task and the nociceptive
pain discrimination task was inconclusive, BF10= 0.47. These results
indicate that our attempt to hold task diﬃculty constant across the
three sensory modalities was not entirely successful. We placed a strict
upper limit of 43.0 °C on the test stimulus in the innocuous warmth
intensity staircase so that it would not increase into the noxious heat
range. However, some participants gave incorrect answers even at the
maximum temperature of the warm test stimulus, so overall perfor-
mance in this modality was slightly worse than in the other two mod-
alities. Such small but reliable diﬀerences in performance reinforce the
need to appropriately control for perceptual sensitivity when quanti-
fying metacognition.
3.1.2. Perceptual sensitivity (d’)
A Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA also showed strong evidence
for diﬀerences in perceptual sensitivity (d’) between sensory modalities,
BF10= 331.75. Follow-up Bayesian paired samples t-tests showed that
perceptual sensitivity was lower in the innocuous warmth discrimina-
tion task (M=1.08, 95% CI= [1.00, 1.15]) than in the visual contrast
discrimination task (M=1.21, 95% CI= [1.16, 1.25]), BF10= 8.98,
and the nociceptive pain discrimination task (M=1.23, 95%
CI= [1.18, 1.28]), BF10= 74.90. There was no diﬀerence between
perceptual sensitivity in the pain discrimination task and the visual
discrimination task, BF10= 0.24 (Fig. 2a). This pattern of results mir-
rors the diﬀerences in the percentage of correct responses between
modalities (see above).
Bayesian Pearson correlations showed that individual diﬀerences in
perceptual sensitivity were not positively correlated between the visual
discrimination task and the warmth discrimination task, r=0.05,
BF+0=0.26. The correlations between the pain and visual dis-
crimination tasks, r=0.15, BF+0= 0.48, and the pain and warmth
discrimination tasks, r=0.27, BF+0=1.35, were inconclusive
Fig. 1. Examples of trials in (a) the visual contrast discrimination task, (b) the innocuous warmth discrimination task, and (c) the nociceptive pain discrimination
task. For all three tasks, two stimuli of diﬀerent intensities were presented sequentially in each trial. Participants made a forced choice intensity discrimination
judgement, and then rated their conﬁdence in that judgement on a 4-point scale.
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(Fig. 3a).
3.2. Second-order (metacognitive) performance
3.2.1. Metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’)
A Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA indicated that there were no
diﬀerences in metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’) between sensory
modalities, BF10= 0.12 (Fig. 2b). Mean metacognitive sensitivity
scores were 1.06 (95% CI= [0.91, 1.21]) for visual contrast intensity
judgements, 0.99 (95% CI= [0.87, 1.10]) for innocuous warmth in-
tensity judgements, and 1.05 (95% CI= [0.91, 1.19]) for nociceptive
pain intensity judgements.
Bayesian Pearson correlations showed that individual diﬀerences in
metacognitive sensitivity were not positively correlated between the
visual discrimination task and the pain discrimination task, r=−0.01,
BF+0= 0.20. The correlations between the visual and warmth dis-
crimination tasks, r=0.13, BF+0=0.42, and the pain and warmth
discrimination tasks, r=0.28, BF+0= 1.44, were inconclusive
(Fig. 3b).
3.2.2. Metacognitive eﬃciency (meta-d’/d’)
We considered that our measure of metacognitive sensitivity—meta-
d’—might be confounded by diﬀerences in perceptual sensitivity be-
tween conditions, because the innocuous warmth discrimination task
was more diﬃcult than the nociceptive pain and visual contrast dis-
crimination tasks (Fig. 2a). In contrast, metacognitive eﬃciency scores
are not confounded by small diﬀerences in perceptual sensitivity be-
tween conditions, because they represent the ratio of metacognitive
sensitivity to perceptual sensitivity (i.e. meta-d’/d’). Thus, metacogni-
tive eﬃciency provides a more appropriate measure than metacognitive
sensitivity for how well conﬁdence tracked performance in each mod-
ality.
A Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA indicated that there were no
diﬀerences in metacognitive eﬃciency (meta-d’/d’) between sensory
modalities, BF10= 0.32 (Fig. 2c). As a group, participants were close to
metacognitive optimality, with metacognitive eﬃciency scores near 1
(vision: M=0.90, 95% CI= [0.78, 1.02]; warmth: M=1.00, 95%
CI= [0.88, 1.12]; pain: M=0.88, 95% CI= [0.77, 1.00]). That is, the
d’ that provided the best ﬁt to conﬁdence ratings was similar to ob-
served perceptual sensitivity. This implies that there was no loss of (or
gain in) perceptual information between the ﬁrst-order perceptual de-
cision and the second-order conﬁdence judgement.
Bayesian Pearson correlations showed strong evidence that in-
dividual diﬀerences in metacognitive eﬃciency were positively corre-
lated between visual discrimination and warmth discrimination tasks,
r=0.42, BF+0=10.20. (Note that we found evidence supporting the
absence of a positive correlation between ﬁrst-order visual and warmth
discrimination performance, i.e. d’, so confounds with perceptual sen-
sitivity cannot explain this ﬁnding.) Further correlation tests indicated
no positive correlation between metacognitive eﬃciency scores in the
visual discrimination task and the pain discrimination task, r=−0.04,
BF+0=0.17. The correlation between the warmth and pain dis-
crimination tasks was low, but inconclusive, r=0.12, BF+0= 0.40
(Fig. 3c).
Our Bayesian correlation tests showed strong evidence for a positive
correlation between metacognitive eﬃciency scores in the visual and
warmth discrimination tasks, and moderate evidence against a positive
correlation between metacognitive eﬃciency scores in the visual and
pain discrimination tasks. However, those tests did not directly com-
pare the correlation coeﬃcients to each other. To test for diﬀerences
between correlation coeﬃcients, we used two-tailed Steiger’s Z tests for
overlapping correlations (employing a standard frequentist hypothesis-
testing approach). We found a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the vision-
warmth and vision-pain correlations, Z=2.13, p=0.033. This further
supports the ﬁnding of greater shared variance in metacognitive eﬃ-
ciency between the visual and warmth discrimination tasks than be-
tween the visual and pain discrimination tasks. Comparisons between
vision-warmth and pain-warmth correlations, Z=1.29, p=0.198, and
between vision-pain and pain-warmth correlations, Z=−0.89,
p=0.372, were not signiﬁcant. (Note that frequentist hypothesis tests
do not distinguish between evidence for the absence of a diﬀerence and
insuﬃcient statistical power to detect a diﬀerence.)
All preceding correlation tests were based on point estimates of
metacognitive eﬃciency from a relatively small number of participants
(N=36). Single-subject estimates of metacognitive eﬃciency can be
noisy, so our estimates of the correlation coeﬃcients may have also
been imprecise. To overcome this potential issue, we used a hierarchical
Bayesian model to estimate the covariance in metacognitive eﬃciency
between visual, warmth, and pain discrimination tasks. A hierarchical
Bayesian model ensures that uncertainty in subject-level parameter
estimates appropriately propagates through to uncertainty around es-
timates of cross-task covariance (Fleming, 2017). In this case, the
hierarchical model ﬁts revealed the same pattern of results as the
single-subject estimates. There was a signiﬁcant positive correlation in
individual diﬀerences in metacognitive eﬃciency between the visual
and warmth discrimination tasks, ρ=0.69, 95% CI= [0.06, 0.98].
(Note that statistical signiﬁcance is obtained when the 95% CI does not
overlap with zero.) Individual diﬀerences in metacognitive eﬃciency
were not correlated between the visual and pain discrimination tasks,
ρ=−0.02, 95% CI= [−0.71, 0.87]. The coeﬃcient for the correlation
between the warmth and pain discrimination tasks was moderately
positive but inconclusive, as the 95% CI overlapped with zero,
ρ=0.35, 95% CI= [−0.48, 0.97].
In all three tasks, several participants had metacognitive eﬃciency
Fig. 2. Mean values of (a) perceptual sensitivity, i.e. d’, (b) metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. meta-d’, (c) metacognitive eﬃciency, i.e. meta-d’/d’, and (d) metacognitive
bias, i.e. mean conﬁdence, in the visual contrast, innocuous warmth, and nociceptive pain discrimination tasks. A Bayes factor (BF10) > 3.00 indicates diﬀerences
between conditions. A BF10 < 0.33 indicates no diﬀerences between conditions. Error bars show 95% credible intervals (CI).
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Fig. 3. Correlations between modalities in (a) perceptual sensitivity, i.e. d’, (b) metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. meta-d’, (c) metacognitive eﬃciency, i.e. meta-d’/d’,
and (d) metacognitive bias, i.e. mean conﬁdence. In each row, all possible pairwise correlations between modalities are shown. A Bayes factor (BF+0) > 3.00
indicates a positive correlation. A BF+0 < 0.33 indicates no positive correlation.
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values greater than 1 (Fig. 3c), indicating higher metacognitive sensi-
tivity (meta-d’) than perceptual sensitivity (d’). This might occur if
conﬁdence depended on some processes independent of performance,
for example processes that occur after decision, or in parallel to deci-
sion-making (Fleming & Daw, 2017). However, both d’ and meta-d’
estimates are inevitably subject to error. Metacognitive eﬃciency, as
the ratio of the latter to the former, will be inﬂuenced by these errors,
particularly when d’ is low. We therefore also examined an alternative
measure of metacognitive eﬃciency, meta-d’−d’, which is less prone to
such error ampliﬁcation. This alternative measure yielded similar re-
sults (see Supplementary Results and Fig. S1).
3.2.3. Metacognitive bias (mean conﬁdence)
A Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA indicated that there were no
diﬀerences in metacognitive bias (mean conﬁdence) between sensory
modalities, BF10= 0.22 (Fig. 2d). Mean conﬁdence ratings were 2.69
(95% CI= [2.57, 2.81]) for visual contrast intensity judgements, 2.70
(95% CI= [2.60, 2.81]) for innocuous warmth intensity judgements,
and 2.76 (95% CI= [2.67, 2.84]) for nociceptive pain intensity jud-
gements.
Bayesian Pearson correlations showed strong evidence that in-
dividual diﬀerences in metacognitive bias were positively correlated
across all three sensory modalities (vision and warmth: r=0.55,
BF+0= 134; vision and pain: r=0.60, BF+0=589; warmth and pain:
r=0.78, BF+0=1.24×106; Fig. 3d).
3.3. Manipulation check for thermal stimuli
A Bayesian paired samples t-test showed strong evidence that par-
ticipants felt a diﬀerence between the lowest level of noxious heat sti-
mulation and the highest level of innocuous warmth stimulation de-
livered on any trial, BF10= 1.24×107, thus validating that the lowest
temperature stimulus in the noxious heat range was rated as more
painful (M=2.47, 95% CI= [2.29, 2.65]) than the highest tempera-
ture stimulus in the innocuous warmth range (M=1.88, 95%
CI= [1.71, 2.04]). There was, however, some variability in how the
stimuli were perceived, both between and within individuals (Fig. 4).
This was expected, yet we were not able to further separate the tem-
perature ranges we used for the innocuous warmth and nociceptive
pain discrimination tasks, due to the maximum safe contact heat tem-
perature of 50.0 °C, and the need to control ﬁrst-order performance by
varying the temperature diﬀerence between stimuli in a staircase pro-
cedure. We consider the implications of this design limitation in the
Discussion. Importantly, our results do not change if we exclude the
four participants who did not rate the lowest level of noxious heat as
more painful than the highest level of innocuous warmth (see Fig. 4a
and Supplementary Results).
4. Discussion
Our results do not support the hypothesis of reduced metacognitive
access to nociceptive pain and innocuous thermal perception, compared
to vision. We found no overall diﬀerences in metacognitive eﬃciency
(meta-d’/d’) between intensity judgements of visual contrast, innocuous
warmth, and nociceptive pain (Fig. 2c). Some authors have proposed
that interoceptive modalities lack the metacognitive sensitivity that
accompanies exteroception (Azevedo et al., 2016; Garﬁnkel et al., 2015;
Khalsa et al., 2008). Like interoceptive senses, the primary functions of
both thermoceptive and nociceptive sensory systems are to maintain
the optimal condition of the body and to defend it from harm (Craig,
2002, 2003). The visual system, on the other hand, allows us to make
ﬁne discriminative judgements about objects and events in our sur-
roundings. The processes of cognitive control and ﬂexible behaviour
enabled by metacognition (Redford, 2010; Yeung & Summerﬁeld,
2012) might better serve discriminative functions than regulatory or
defensive functions, the latter of which must operate eﬀectively without
conscious oversight. Nevertheless, our study indicates comparable
metacognitive access to both discriminative and regulatory sensory
modalities.
Moreover, we found that individual diﬀerences in metacognitive
eﬃciency were positively correlated between the visual contrast and
innocuous warmth discrimination tasks (Fig. 3c). Importantly, that
correlation must have arisen from individual diﬀerences in metacog-
nition rather than ﬁrst-order perception, because there was no corre-
lation in ﬁrst-order perceptual sensitivity (d’) between the same tasks
(Fig. 3a). This ﬁnding suggests there is a common metacognitive system
for vision and innocuous thermal perception, despite their disparate
roles in ﬁne discrimination of stimulus attributes and regulation of the
body’s condition, respectively. A previous study found no correlation in
metacognitive sensitivity between a discriminative sense (touch) and
regulatory, interoceptive senses (cardiac and respiratory signals), sug-
gesting distinct metacognitive processes for those sensory categories
(Garﬁnkel et al., 2016). However, those authors used a measure of
metacognitive sensitivity—the type II ROC curve—that is potentially
confounded by perceptual task performance. Our measure of meta-
cognitive eﬃciency is not subject to such confounds (Fleming & Lau,
2014).
Conversely, we found evidence against the existence of a correlation
between metacognitive eﬃciency for vision and nociception (Fig. 3c).
Further, we found little evidence of a correlation in metacognitive
Fig. 4. Variability in participants’ ratings of the highest level of stimulation used in the innocuous warmth discrimination task (max. 43.0 °C) and the lowest level of
stimulation used in the nociceptive pain discrimination task (always 45.0 °C). Overall, the lowest level of noxious heat was perceived as more painful than the highest
level of innocuous warmth. However, perception of these stimuli varied both (a) between participants and (b) between trials.
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eﬃciency between nociception and innocuous thermoception, even
though the two are similar in terms of their functional roles and phy-
siological pathways (Craig, 2002, 2003). This is particularly striking
because we used the same equipment and procedure to administer the
stimuli for the innocuous warmth and nociceptive pain discrimination
tasks, except that the thermal probe temperature was increased into the
noxious heat range in the latter task. The unshared variance in noci-
ceptive metacognition was not predicted, and awaits further support
from replication studies. Nevertheless, we consider that it could either
reﬂect a distinct metacognitive process, or an additional source of
variation due to individual diﬀerences in some component that ac-
companies pain, such as aﬀect or arousal responses. Pain has a strong
aﬀective component in addition to its sensory component (Melzack &
Casey, 1968). Ratings of pain intensity and unpleasantness can even be
dissociated, (e.g. Gracely, Dubner, & McGrath, 1979; Rainville et al.,
1999; Smith, Gracely, & Safer, 1998), suggesting that aﬀect is a dis-
tinctive component of pain, rather than a mere by-product. In our no-
ciceptive pain discrimination task, participants reported which of two
noxious heat stimuli was more painful without being asked to focus on
either sensory or aﬀective aspects, so their judgements presumably
reﬂected both these components of pain. Moreover, pain can produce
physiological arousal responses (Hilgard & Morgan, 1975; Lenox, 1970;
Rainville et al., 1999; Storm, 2008), another factor known to inﬂuence
metacognition (Allen et al., 2016; Hauser et al., 2017). Since noxious
heat stimuli are both more arousing and more negatively valenced than
innocuous thermal or visual contrast stimuli, these potential sources of
variability would have been stronger in the nociceptive pain dis-
crimination task than in the other tasks. Either the aﬀective or arousal
components of pain may thus have contributed to the unshared var-
iance in nociceptive metacognition that we found here.
In all three discrimination tasks, there were several participants
with metacognitive eﬃciency (meta-d’/d’) values greater than 1
(Fig. 3c). Such a ﬁnding could potentially result from imprecise esti-
mates of low values of d’. Although there were a few outliers with low
d’ values in the warmth discrimination task (Fig. 3a), for the most part,
our staircase procedure yielded suﬃciently high levels of d’ to avoid
this problem. Moreover, we analysed our data using an alternative, non-
ratio measure of metacognitive eﬃciency (meta-d’−d’), and found the
same results (see Supplementary Results and Fig. S1). Thus, our ﬁnding
suggests that some participants experienced a gain in conﬁdence-related
information between their ﬁrst-order perceptual decision and their
subsequent, second-order conﬁdence rating. Some previous studies that
measured metacognitive eﬃciency have also found this trend (Charles,
Van Opstal, Marti, & Dehaene, 2013; Faivre, Filevich, Solovey, Kühn, &
Blanke, 2018). One possible explanation is that parallel accumulation of
evidence or post-decisional processing allowed the recognition of errors
in ﬁrst-order decisions (Charles et al., 2013; Fleming & Daw, 2017). Our
use of unspeeded perceptual judgements should have mitigated this
inﬂuence by reducing errors related to quick responses. Nonetheless,
given the diﬃculty of the discriminations they were asked to make,
some participants may have changed their minds after their ﬁrst deci-
sion and assigned lower conﬁdence ratings to trials where they made an
error, resulting in higher metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’) than per-
ceptual sensitivity (d’).
In addition, we examined metacognitive bias across vision, in-
nocuous warmth, and nociceptive pain perception. There were no
overall diﬀerences in conﬁdence between modalities (Fig. 2d), and in-
dividual diﬀerences in mean conﬁdence ratings were highly correlated
across all three tasks (Fig. 3d). This is consistent with previous studies
that found correlations in mean conﬁdence levels across diﬀerent tasks,
both within and between sensory modalities (Ais, Zylberberg, Barttfeld,
& Sigman, 2016; Song et al., 2011) and between perceptual and
memory domains (Baird, Cieslak, Smallwood, Grafton, & Schooler,
2015; Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 2013; McCurdy
et al., 2013). Some studies also found a task-dependent component of
metacognitive bias which was attributed to diﬀerences in diﬃculty
between tasks (Baird et al., 2015; Baird et al., 2013; Song et al., 2011).
We did not ﬁnd a task-dependent component of metacognitive bias,
even though the innocuous warmth discrimination task was more dif-
ﬁcult than the nociceptive pain discrimination task and the visual
contrast discrimination task. Thus, our participants did not adjust their
average conﬁdence reports according to task diﬃculty. In this study, at
least, consistent individual diﬀerences in conﬁdence were the strongest
contributing factor to metacognitive bias.
Altogether, the results of our correlation tests suggest that meta-
cognition consists of both a modality-independent component (i.e.
metacognitive bias) and a modality-dependent component (i.e. meta-
cognitive eﬃciency). The former was a consistent trait of individuals,
while the latter diﬀerentiated judgements about nociceptive pain.
Further, our ﬁndings suggest that metacognitive ability does not dis-
sociate between senses serving primarily regulatory or discriminative
functions, as has been previously suggested for interoceptive and ex-
teroceptive somatosensory modalities (Garﬁnkel et al., 2016). How-
ever, our results also refute pure modality-speciﬁcity in metacognitive
ability, whereby individual diﬀerences in metacognitive eﬃciency
would not correlate across any sensory modalities.
Conﬁdence is often modelled as the strength or quality of the evi-
dence that contributes to a ﬁrst-order decision (Kepecs, Uchida,
Zariwala, & Mainen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Merkle & Van Zandt,
2006). However, it is unclear how ﬁrst-order models could account for
diﬀerences in covariance of metacognitive ability across modalities, as
we observed here. In contrast, hierarchical models conceptualise me-
tacognition as a distinct second-order network that represents and
evaluates the state of the ﬁrst-order network computing the decision
(Cleeremans, Timmermans, & Pasquali, 2007; Fleming & Daw, 2017;
Pasquali, Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 2010). Such models might ex-
plain our results in two ways. Under one account, metacognitive ability
might be correlated when sensory evidence for two diﬀerent modalities
converges on a single metacognitive monitoring process. This account
might predict a distinct metacognitive monitoring process for noci-
ception—although why this separate circuit should have evolved re-
mains unclear (Fig. 5a). Alternatively, as we mentioned above, there
might be a single metacognitive mechanism for all sensory modalities,
but this mechanism might be diﬀerentially aﬀected by non-sensory
inputs such as arousal or aﬀect. Modalities that diﬀer sharply in their
recruitment of these additional factors would also exhibit low correla-
tions in metacognitive ability (Fig. 5b).
Deﬁnitions of pain routinely insist on its subjective nature, and
some hold the view that pain can never have any ‘ground truth’ in the
physical properties of the world. Chronic pain conditions, which
sometimes lack any apparent neurophysiological aetiology, might en-
courage this view. In our study, however, participants made judgements
about pain that directly resulted from noxious thermal stimulation of
nociceptive sensory pathways. Moreover, the 2IFC intensity dis-
crimination task we used was speciﬁcally designed to test a dis-
criminative aspect of nociceptive pain, similarly to our tests of in-
nocuous warmth and visual contrast discrimination. By applying signal
detection theory, we could determine how much participants’ pain re-
ports were informed by the properties of the evoking stimulus (i.e. the
ﬁrst-order judgement), as well as how people experienced the processes
that contributed to the formation of their pain reports (i.e. the second-
order judgement, captured here using the established method of con-
ﬁdence ratings). This method allowed us to investigate the relation
between judgements about experimentally evoked pain and underlying
nociceptive processes, without insisting that pain is reducible to noci-
ception. An alternative approach could have been to ask participants to
report which noxious stimulus was hotter, rather than which was more
painful. Such an instruction may have induced them to focus on the
thermal quality of the noxious stimulation instead of its painfulness.
The potential impact of this manipulation on our ﬁndings is an open
question, and would depend upon whether the unshared variance in
metacognitive eﬃciency for nociceptive pain came from the noxious
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nature of the stimulus, or from the task requirement to judge pain le-
vels.
One limitation of our study was an inability to adjust the tem-
perature ranges of innocuous warmth and noxious heat stimulation so
that, for every participant, the latter always felt painful and the former
never felt painful at all. We were constrained by safety considerations,
which placed an upper limit of 50.0 °C on contact thermal stimulation.
Additionally, we were constrained by the need to adapt the intensity of
the test stimulus throughout the task, so that we could control ﬁrst-
order task performance and speciﬁcally test diﬀerences between mod-
alities at the metacognitive level. For the innocuous warmth dis-
crimination task, in particular, this often required a large diﬀerence
between stimulus temperatures. Thus, we could not further separate the
innocuous and noxious temperature ranges without compromising
these important considerations, even though it meant that participants
would sometimes perceive the upper end of the innocuous warmth
range as somewhat painful, or the lower end of the noxious heat range
as not at all painful (Fig. 4). If, as we speculate above, the unshared
variance in metacognitive eﬃciency for nociceptive pain judgements
arose from aﬀective or arousal responses to noxious stimulation, then
we might have found a clearer dissociation between metacognitive ef-
ﬁciency for innocuous warmth and nociceptive pain discrimination if
we had adjusted the temperature ranges used for each individual par-
ticipant based on their painfulness. It is also possible that conﬁdence in
judgements about nociceptive pain intensity could be substantively
diﬀerent when discriminating a painful stimulus and a non-painful
stimulus, compared to two painful stimuli. We cannot exclude the
possibility that some trials in our nociceptive pain discrimination task
involved comparing stimuli of diﬀerent quality (painful vs non-painful)
rather than comparing stimuli of diﬀerent intensity (more vs less
painful). This may have introduced some variance in metacognitive
eﬃciency that was not shared with the other tasks. Future studies could
explore these issues by using innocuous and noxious thermal stimula-
tion parameters that separate more clearly along the dimension of
painfulness (e.g. innocuous cool temperatures vs noxious heat stimuli).
To conclude, we demonstrated that conﬁdence tracks perceptual
intensity judgements as precisely for nociceptive pain as for other
modalities. However, we found no correlation between metacognitive
eﬃciency for nociception and for vision, and minimal correlation be-
tween metacognitive eﬃciency for nociception and for thermoception.
Thus, second-order judgements about nociceptive pain level appear to
involve an additional factor, which may be the arousal and/or aﬀective
responses typical of noxious stimulation. Metacognitive appraisal is
closely linked to higher-order accounts of conscious experience (Lau &
Rosenthal, 2011). Our ﬁndings are thus consistent with the interesting
possibility that distinctive and idiosyncratic features of the nociceptive
pain experience, namely high vividness and inter-individual variability,
may lie in the aﬀective or motivational components of pain rather than
the sensory component.
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